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Tyler’s process-based model of regulation suggests that when citizens perceive the police as a 
legitimate authority, they are more likely to cooperate in the form of reporting crimes and 
providing information to the police. Yet most studies have considered citizens’ perceptions of 
police legitimacy—few studies have asked the police what they feel makes them legitimate in the 
eyes of the public. Likewise, no studies have considered whether the police believe legitimacy is 
associated with cooperation from the public. The present study addresses this gap using data 
from a stratified sample of U.S. police executives. Findings suggest police believe performance, 
rather than procedural justice, is the key to generating cooperation from the public. 
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The police rely heavily on cooperation from the public in order to perform their jobs. If 
not for citizens reporting crimes after they occur, a great deal of crime would go unnoticed by 
law enforcement. A rapidly growing body of research suggests that the best way for the police to 
increase the likelihood of being met by cooperation from the public is to be perceived by citizens 
as a legitimate authority. A consistent theme in this line of research is that citizens are more 
likely to view the police as legitimate when they exercise their authority in a procedurally fair 
manner (Jackson, Bradford, Stanko, & Hohl, 2012; Mazerolle, Bennett, Antrobus, & Eggins, 
2012; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
 The problem, however, is that few studies have considered whether the police correctly 
perceive the sources of their legitimacy in the eyes of the public (see Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 
2014; Nix, 2015), and no studies to date have considered whether the police are aware of the 
beneficial outcomes of legitimacy. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) suggest that legitimacy is an 
ongoing dialogue between power-holders and (sometimes multiple) audiences. To date, research 
has primarily focused on “audience legitimacy.” But what are the practical implications of this 
body of research if the police themselves do not understand how citizens perceive and respond to 
police legitimacy? How can the police be expected to emphasize procedural fairness when 
interacting with citizens if they are not aware of its potential to increase cooperation? Indeed, 
there is evidence that police officers rely on their own experiences more so than expert opinions 
when determining “what works in policing” (Lum, Telep, Koper, & Grieco, 2012, p. 78). It is 
therefore critical to consider the dialogic nature of legitimacy as Bottoms and Tankebe suggest. 
A key initial inquiry is whether or not the police understand that legitimacy promotes 
cooperation from the public. Relatedly, it is important to consider the possibility that the police 
might think different factors shape public cooperation in various segments of the community.  
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 The current study explores these ideas by considering the dialogic nature of legitimacy. 
Specifically, the current study considers whether the police think being perceived as a legitimate 
authority increases the likelihood of being met with cooperation from citizens residing in high 
and low crime areas of the community. This is accomplished using survey data from a stratified 
sample of U.S. law enforcement executives (N = 643). Practical and theoretical implications of 
the findings are discussed.  
Literature Review 
 In order for the police to effectively deal with crime in society, they must rely to a certain 
extent on cooperation from citizens. The police simply cannot be everywhere at once; thus, they 
cannot rely solely on catching offenders in the act of committing their crimes. A great deal of 
crime only comes to the attention of the police after it has occurred and offenders are long 
gone—that is, when citizens report crime to the police. Crimes such as burglary, for example, are 
especially difficult for the police to address because citizens often do not discover they have 
been victimized until long after the commission of the burglary (Mawby, 2013). In a similar 
fashion, police investigators rely heavily on witnesses and victims providing information that can 
help them solve cases. If citizens do not feel inclined to provide helpful information to the police, 
their job becomes much more difficult. The police therefore have a vested interest in generating 
citizen cooperation so that they can adequately perform their job.  
 The process-based model of regulation suggests that citizens are more likely to cooperate 
with the police when they perceive them as a legitimate authority (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 
2002). Legitimacy concerns the right of a power-holder to rule and the degree to which the ruled 
acknowledge said right (Beetham, 1991; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Coicaud, 2002). As it 
pertains to legal authorities like the police, “legitimacy reflects people’s views about the degree 
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to which they feel a responsibility to support legal authorities and defer to their decisions” (Tyler 
& Huo, 2002, p. 101). There has been considerable debate regarding the best way to measure 
legitimacy in recent years, but Tyler (1990, 2003) conceptualized legitimacy as trust and 
perceived obligation to obey.1 However, scholars have since demonstrated that the two concepts 
do not load together onto a single factor (Gau, 2011, 2013; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007). For 
example, upon disaggregating Tyler’s legitimacy index, Reisig et al. (2007) found that trust in 
the police influenced cooperation but obligation to obey did not. Recent research has treated trust 
as both theoretically and empirically distinct from legitimacy (e.g., Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & 
Kaminski, 2014; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013). 
The correlation between police legitimacy and cooperation has received empirical 
support (Bradford, 2014; Jackson et al., 2012; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Murphy, Hinds, & 
Fleming, 2008; Reisig, Tankebe, & Meško, 2014). For instance, using face-to-face interview data 
from the London Metropolitan Police’s Public Attitudes Survey (METPAS), Jackson et al. 
(2012) found that police legitimacy was correlated with greater cooperation. Murphy et al. 
(2008) reached a similar conclusion using a survey of 2611 Australian citizens, but found that 
citizens who felt the police performed well in terms of controlling crime felt less inclined to 
cooperate with the police. Murphy and Cherney (2012) found that among both ethnic minorities 
and non-minorities, perceived legitimacy of the police was significantly associated with 
                                                          
1 Jackson et al. (2012) define legitimacy as a sense of moral alignment with the police in addition to a perceived 
obligation to obey (i.e., “the police usually act in ways that are consistent with my own ideas about what is right and 
wrong”). These authors also consider legality (i.e., acting in accordance with the law; see also Beetham, 1991) to be 
an important component of legitimacy. Tyler (2003, p. 310) argues that “perceived obligation to obey is the most 
direct extension of the concept of legitimacy,” but Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) suggest that citizens can feel 
obligated to obey the law or legal authorities for reasons other than perceived legitimacy. Perhaps citizens obey legal 
authorities out of “dull compulsion,” which Carrabine (2004, p. 180) suggests occurs with inmates in the prison 
context (i.e., they are powerless to do anything else but obey the authorities). Tankebe (2013) uses data from 5,120 
interviews with London residents to demonstrate that legitimacy is comprised of four dimensions and exerts a direct 
effect on citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the police independent of perceived obligation to obey. These four 
dimensions are procedural justice, distributive justice, lawfulness, and effectiveness. 
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willingness to cooperate. However, among a Ghanaian sample, Tankebe (2009) found that 
cooperation was influenced more by perceived effectiveness of the police than perceived 
legitimacy. Still, the evidence overwhelmingly favors the notion that perceived legitimacy of the 
police promotes cooperation among citizens. How then, do the police achieve legitimacy? 
Sources of Legitimacy 
 The process-based model suggests that the best way for the police to go about achieving 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public is to interact with citizens in a procedurally just manner. 
There are two components of procedural justice: quality of decision making (i.e., allowing 
citizens to have a voice in the decision making process, and neutrality, competence, and 
consistency on the part of the decision maker) and quality of interpersonal treatment (i.e., 
treating individuals with dignity and respect, acknowledging their rights, and considering their 
needs; see, e.g., Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that procedural justice is the primary antecedent of evaluations of 
police legitimacy net of individual or contextual variables (Gau, 2011, 2013; Reisig et al., 2007; 
Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Wolfe, 2011; Wolfe, Nix, Kaminski, & Rojek, 
2015; c.f. Gau, Corsaro, Stewart, & Brunson, 2012). That is, individuals who believe police 
actions are procedurally fair are more likely to perceive them as a legitimate authority. In turn, 
they become more likely to cooperate with police by reporting crimes and providing information. 
Thus, procedural justice on the part of the police ultimately yields cooperation—in statistical 
terminology, its effect is mediated by perceived legitimacy. Yet there are other ways the police 
may go about cultivating legitimacy in the eyes of the public—thus securing greater cooperation.  
In contrast to procedural justice, a normative perspective which focuses on fairness of 
procedures, distributive justice is an instrumental perspective that focuses on fairness of 
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outcomes (Sarat, 1977). Citizens who believe that the police enforce the law consistently and 
provide the same quality of service to all people tend to view them as a more legitimate authority 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). For example, Tyler and Wakslak (2004) demonstrated that perceived 
racial profiling by the police was associated with lower levels of perceived legitimacy of the 
police. While distributive justice is important in terms of establishing legitimacy, the available 
evidence suggests it is less important than procedural justice (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Reisig et 
al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2005; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Another predictor of 
police legitimacy focuses on how well the police respond to crime and disorder (i.e., 
performance; see Tyler, 2005; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). For example, Sunshine and Tyler 
(2003) found that the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy was about five times greater than 
the effect of a police performance scale. Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd (2013) used a natural 
experiment to demonstrate that even in the face of threats to national security, procedural justice 
outperformed police performance in terms of its effect on Israeli citizens’ perceptions of police 
legitimacy. Thus, while performance has been linked to legitimacy, procedural fairness appears 
to matter more to citizens (Jackson et al., 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Wolfe et al., 2015). 
 The available evidence therefore indicates that procedural justice can be a powerful tool 
for officers to draw upon during citizen interactions. That is, citizens will be more likely to view 
the police as legitimate and in turn become more likely to cooperate with police in the long term. 
But the literature has not reached a firm conclusion about whether or not the police are aware of 
the power of this process-based model of regulation. Indeed, the police may believe other 
factors, such as performance, are more important to establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public. Research suggests this may be a less efficient means of generating public cooperation.  
The Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy 
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Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) recently proposed that researchers adopt a “dialogic” 
approach to understanding legitimacy. According to the authors, legitimacy involves two parties: 
power holders and audiences. In order to truly understand legitimacy, researchers must think of it 
as an ongoing dialogue between these two parties. According to Bottoms and Tankebe, power-
holders (e.g., the police) first make a claim to legitimacy. The audience (e.g., the community) 
then responds—either positively or negatively—to that claim. Power holders, in turn, observe the 
audience’s response to their claim to legitimacy and may or may not choose to alter it as a result. 
The majority of studies that ensued in response to Tyler’s theory have been concerned 
with audience legitimacy. Yet if the police make claims to legitimacy which are ultimately not in 
line with what the public needs, it is likely that the public will not recognize the police as 
legitimate. Thus, police officers’ understanding of the foundations of their legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public needs to be assessed. This is crucial to the success of the process-based model of 
regulation. For the model to work, the police must understand that procedural fairness is the key 
to increasing long-term cooperation. Examining officers’ views of how the public evaluates them 
will shed light on the degree to which the process-based model is feasible in practice and can 
prove useful in the translation of citizen survey results into actionable police behaviors. In 
response to Bottoms and Tankebe’s arguments, Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014) surveyed 290 
Israeli police officers and discovered that they associated their legitimacy with performance 
more so than with procedural fairness. In other words, the Israeli officers believed that citizens’ 
evaluations of their legitimacy are based more on how well they fight crime than on how fairly 
they treat members of the public. 
Importantly, Bottoms and Tankebe also suggest that power holders must consider their 
legitimacy as it pertains to multiple audiences—particularly when those audiences have 
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conflicting interests. The factors that shape individuals’ perceptions of police legitimacy might 
vary according to, for example, the level of perceived danger or threat of victimization in an 
area. Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd (2013) demonstrated that Israeli citizens living in areas that 
experienced more frequent security threats were more concerned with the performance of the 
police than their counterparts living in areas that experienced fewer security threats. At the same 
time, procedural justice was the primary antecedent of legitimacy in both areas.  
A distinct but related question that remains under-explored is whether or not police 
legitimacy is partially contingent upon the level of crime in an area. Perhaps, like citizens living 
in areas facing security threats, those residing in high crime areas are more concerned with police 
performance than citizens residing in low crime areas. Wolfe et al. (2015) address this question 
by interacting citizen perceptions of police performance with a dummy variable indicating 
whether the citizen lived in a “low crime neighborhood.” The interaction term failed to achieve 
statistical significance, meaning that in their sample, level of crime did not condition citizens’ 
perceptions of police performance. In other words, citizens in the low crime neighborhood were 
not significantly more or less concerned with police performance than citizens residing in high 
crime neighborhoods. Still, in terms of the dialogic approach to legitimacy, it seems reasonable 
that the police might believe this to be the case. Nix (2015) demonstrated that U.S. police 
executives believe citizens of low crime areas feel more obligated to obey police when they think 
the police are performing well; in contrast, the responding officers felt procedural justice and 
distributive justice were more important to citizens residing in high crime areas. To date, there 
are no studies that consider whether the police: (a) understand that enhancing their legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public is the key to generating cooperation, or (b) think that citizen cooperation 
hinges on different factors depending on the level of crime in an area. 
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The Current Study 
 Using the dialogic model of legitimacy as a framework, the current study addresses this 
gap in the literature by exploring what officers believe is the best way to achieve cooperation 
from citizens residing in high crime areas and low crime areas of the community. It is important 
to gauge police officers’ understanding of the best way to achieve cooperation from the public 
because they may not be privy to the empirical success of the process-based model of regulation. 
It bears repeating: how can the police be expected to emphasize procedural fairness during 
interactions with citizens if they are unaware that it ultimately yields greater public cooperation? 
Method 
Data 
The present study uses survey data from a nationally representative sample of law 
enforcement executives drawn from the 2014 National Directory of Law Enforcement 
Administrators (NDLEA) database. It is important to gauge the perceptions of Chief Executives 
because the ideas they embrace are likely to trickle down throughout the agency and influence 
line-level officers. In Tyler’s (2011, p. 261) words: “The organizational culture of police 
departments is shaped by the values articulated by their leaders.” All municipal and county 
police departments as well as sheriff’s departments in the database were included in the sampling 
frame. In an effort to reduce sampling error and allow for identification of potential differences 
between groups, stratification was used to group similar law enforcement executives together in 
terms of population served, region of the U.S., and agency type (Sudman, 1976). In terms of 
population served, agencies were placed into one of five groups: (1) less than 10,000, (2) 10,000 
– 49,999, (3) 50,000 – 99,999, (4) 100,000 or more, and (5) missing population data.2 With 
                                                          
2 The NDLEA database did not provide a population count for 698 agencies. As such, these agencies were placed 
into a fifth “missing population” stratum for sampling purposes. This approach is similar to that of Smith et al. 
11 
respect to region, agencies were placed into one of four U.S. census categories—Northeast, 
Midwest, South, or West.3 Finally, with regard to agency type, agencies were categorized as 
either police departments (whether county or municipal) or sheriff’s departments. 
There were a total of 12,315 county or city/municipal police agencies and 3,059 sheriff’s 
departments in the sampling frame. In an effort to maximize the chances of receiving completed 
surveys from executives at agencies serving large populations, those in the 100,000 or more 
population group were sampled with certainty (n=859). These agencies represent only five 
percent of municipal police/sheriff’s departments in the U.S. but their officers/deputies interact 
with a much larger proportion of the public. Thus it was deemed imperative to maximize the 
probability of receiving completed surveys from executives at these agencies.  
The remainder of the sample (n = 1,141) was drawn from agencies in the other 32 strata. 
This required 35.7 agencies per stratum; however, six strata had a very small number of agencies 
(46 altogether). As such, all agencies in these six strata were sampled. Then, 42 executives were 
randomly selected from each remaining stratum with fewer than 1,000 agencies, and 43 
executives were randomly selected from each remaining stratum with more than 1,000 agencies. 
These steps resulted in the selection of 2,000 law enforcement executives to receive the survey. 
A mixed-strategy method was used to elicit participation—executives received a hardcopy 
survey in the mail but were also given the option to complete the survey online at a password 
protected website (Dillman et al., 2009). A total of 663 agencies returned completed surveys 
representing a 33.5% response rate (72.4% of respondents completed the mail version). 
                                                          
(2008) which used an older version of the NDLEA database. More important, to simply exclude those agencies with 
missing population data would be problematic if they are in some way significantly different than those agencies 
that do have population data. Excluding these agencies would thus require making an assumption that their 
population data is missing at random. 
3 These are the same regions used by the Uniform Crime Report (UCR). 
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However, a total of 20 surveys were completed by a civilian employee and are thus unfit for 
inclusion in the analyses. As such, all analyses conducted below include responses from sworn 
personnel only (N = 643).4 As is common in survey research, a small proportion of respondents 
did not provide answers to all of the questions. Imputation of missing data was completed using 
the Stata 13 hotdeck suite (Andridge & Little, 2010; Fuller & Kim, 2005; Gmel, 2001). 
Finally, because agencies within various strata had different probabilities of being 
selected, and because the strata produced varying response rates, a weighting procedure is used 
to provide a better understanding of police perceptions of their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public nationwide. Each strata is weighted based on the extent to which its collection of agencies 
is represented by the survey respondents belonging to that strata. That is, the strata are weighted 
so that the findings from this sample are more representative of agencies nationwide. Foregoing 
this weighting procedure could result in biased estimates (see Smith et al., 2010 for a similar 
discussion). The Appendix provides the number of agencies that fall into each stratum 
nationwide, the percentage representation of these agencies among all municipal/county police 
and sheriff’s departments in the sampling frame (N = 15,356), the number of agencies among the 
survey respondents, and the percentage representation of these agencies among survey 
respondents used in the analyses (N = 643). The weights used in each of the analyses are 
obtained by dividing Column B by Column D. 
High versus Low Crime Areas 
The present study asked respondents to consider two areas in their jurisdiction—one 
characterized by high rates of crime and another with relatively low criminal activity. Then, each 
                                                          
4 Note that executives were asked to complete the survey, but should they delegate the survey to someone else, they 
were asked to give it to an officer whom they deemed qualified to respond on behalf of the agency. A total of 307 
executives (or about 48 percent of the sample) completed the survey themselves, while 336 had one of their officers 
complete the survey. As such, analyses in the present study control for the rank of the responding officer.  
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survey question was presented twice—once as it pertained to the high crime area and again as it 
pertained to the low crime area. Respondents were instructed to answer each question as they felt 
the average citizen residing in each of these areas would answer. For example, respondents were 
asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that “residents of high crime areas are willing 
to call the police to report a crime” as well as the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that 
“residents of low crime areas are willing to call the police to report a crime.” For the sake of 
simplicity, each of the survey items used to construct independent and dependent variables is 
presented only once in general terms. In actuality, there are two of each survey item—one for 
high crime areas and one for low crime areas. This allows for a comparison of responding 
officers’ perceptions of the likelihood of citizens in each area exhibiting cooperative behaviors. 
Dependent Variable 
 Cooperation. Respondents were presented with two questions intended to measure 
perceived willingness of citizens to cooperate: “Residents are willing to call the police to report a 
crime” and “Residents are willing to provide information to the police to help find a suspected 
criminal or solve a case” (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Responses were 
measured on a 4-item Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). Principal-axis 
factor analysis (PAF) revealed that the items loaded onto separate factors for high and low crime 
areas (high crime λ = 1.07, factor loadings > 0.71; low crime λ = 1.09, factor loadings > 0.71).5 
The items were used to construct two distinct scales (cooperation in high crime areas [r = 0.63] 
and cooperation in low crime areas [r = 0.64]; see Pearson [1895]) ranging from 2 to 8, with 
higher scores indicating that responding officers believe citizens are more willing to cooperate 
with the police. The distribution of the two cooperation scales suggests the sample believes 
                                                          
5 Orthogonal varimax rotation was used in this and all other instances in the present study. 
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citizens in both high (M = 5.811, SD = 1.392) and low crime areas (M = 6.675, SD = 1.302) are 
fairly willing to cooperate with the police. Note, however, that the difference between the two 
means is statistically significant (t = -16.83, p < .01). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 
each of the variables used in the analyses. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Independent Variables 
Procedural justice. Procedural justice in the eyes of the public (as perceived by the 
police) was measured using five items: “Residents believe officers treat those they encounter 
with politeness and dignity,” “Residents believe officers respect the rights of the citizens they 
come in contact with,” “Residents believe officers make decisions based on facts, not personal 
interest,” “Residents believe officers take the time to listen to people” and “Residents believe 
officers allow people involved to express their views before making a decision in a case” 
(Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Again, responses were measured on 
a 4-item Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). PAF revealed that the 
procedural justice items loaded onto separate factors for high and low crime areas (high crime λ 
= 3.00, factor loadings > 0.64; low crime λ = 2.45, factor loadings > 0.45). The items also 
demonstrated strong internal consistency (high crime α = 0.89; low crime α = 0.85; see, e.g., 
Cortina, 1993) and were thus used to create two scales ranging from 5 to 20, with higher scores 
indicating that responding officers believe citizens think the police exercise their authority in a 
procedurally fair manner.  
 Distributive justice. Distributive justice was measured using two items. Respondents 
were asked to indicate the extent they agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly 
agree) that “Residents believe the police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all 
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people” and “Residents believe the police provide the same quality of service to all citizens” 
(Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). PAF revealed that the items loaded onto separate 
factors for high and low crime areas (high crime λ = 1.45, factor loadings > 0.81; low crime λ = 
1.24, factor loadings > 0.75). The items were used to construct two scales (distributive justice in 
high crime areas [r = 0.79] and distributive justice in low crime areas [r = 0.72]) ranging from 2 
to 8, with higher scores indicating that responding officers believe citizens think the police 
distribute their services and enforce the law equally throughout the community.  
 Performance. Citizens’ impressions of police performance (as perceived by the 
responding officers) were measured via six survey items on a four-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree): “Residents believe the police are efficient in handling 
crime in their area of residence,” “Residents believe officers respond quickly when they call for 
help,” “Residents believe the police are effective in handling violent crimes in the community,” 
“Residents believe the police are effective in handling drug crimes in the community,” 
“Residents believe the police deal well with property crimes in the community,” and “Residents 
feel this is a safe community during the evening/night” (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). PAF revealed that the performance items loaded onto separate factors 
for high and low crime areas (high crime λ = 3.22, factor loadings > 0.59; low crime λ = 3.09, 
factor loadings > 0.52). The items also demonstrated strong internal consistency (high crime α = 
0.87; low crime α = 0.85) and as such, were used to construct two summated scales ranging from 
6 to 24, with higher scores reflecting a belief on the part of responding officers that citizens think 
the police are effective and efficient in dealing with crime. 
Perceived trust. In order to capture perceived levels of citizen trust, respondents were 
asked the extent to which they felt residents “feel the police make the right decisions for people 
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in their area of residence,” “agree with the values that guide the work of our agency,” and 
“believe the police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in their 
neighborhood” (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013). 
Responses were measured on a four-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly 
agree). The six items loaded onto two factors (high crime λ = 1.57, factor loadings > 0.65; low 
crime λ = 1.57, factor loadings > 0.65), each demonstrating strong internal consistency (high 
crime α = .79; low crime α = .79). The items were therefore used to construct two scales ranging 
from 3 to 12, with higher scores on the scales suggesting that the responding officer thinks that 
citizens believe police actions are made in good faith and with the community in mind.  
Perceived obligation to obey. In order to capture perceived level of citizens’ obligation 
to obey the police, respondents were asked the extent to which they felt residents “believe they 
should accept decisions made by the police, even if they think the police are wrong,” “believe 
they should do what the police say, even if they do not understand the reason for police actions,” 
“believe they should do what the police say even if they disagree,” and “believe they should do 
what the police say even when they do not like the way they are being treated” (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003). Again, responses were measured on a four-point Likert scale. The eight items 
loaded onto two factors (high crime λ = 2.09, factor loadings > 0.58; low crime λ = 1.76, factor 
loadings > 0.54), each demonstrating strong internal consistency (high crime α = 0.84; low crime 
α = 0.81). Accordingly, the items were used to construct two scales ranging from 4 to 16, with 
higher scores on the scales suggesting that the responding officer believes that citizens feel more 
obligated to obey the police. 
Controls 
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In addition to the aforementioned variables, several demographic control variables are 
included in the analyses in order to provide unbiased estimates of key predictor variables on 
responding officers’ perceptions of citizen cooperation. Rank (1 = chief executive), as well as 
experience both at the current agency and in the current position are all dummy coded (1 = 10 or 
more years of experience). Gender (1 = male), race (1 = racial minority) and agency type (1 = 
county or municipal police department; 0 = sheriff’s department) are also dummy coded. Region 
is measured with three dummy variables (Midwest, South, and West; Northeast is the reference 
category). Large city is defined as those agencies in the 75th percentile of the sample in terms of 
population served (1 = agencies serving 210,000 or more citizens). 
Analytic Strategy 
A series of six regression models will be used to explore responding officers’ perceptions 
of what makes citizens in high crime areas more likely to cooperate. First, the effect of 
procedural justice on cooperation will be examined, net of statistical controls. Then, the effects 
of distributive justice and performance on cooperation are examined respectively, holding all 
else constant. Next, the extent to which respondents believe trust is associated with cooperation 
is examined net of statistical controls. The relationship between obligation to obey and 
cooperation is subsequently examined net of the influence of control variables. Finally, the 
effects of procedural justice, distributive justice, performance, trust, and obligation to obey on 
cooperation are examined, holding all else constant. Analyzing the data in this fashion will reveal 
whether responding officers feel procedural justice, distributive justice, and/or performance are 
directly associated with citizen cooperation (i.e., rather than indirectly influencing cooperation 
through their influence on legitimacy). The same steps are followed when exploring responding 
officers’ perceptions of what makes citizens in low crime areas more likely to cooperate.  
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Diagnostic tests demonstrated that harmful levels of collinearity do not appear to be 
present in the multivariate models presented below. All bivariate correlations fell below an 
absolute value of .73 for the high crime area variables and .69 for the low crime area variables. 
Typically .80 is used as a threshold indicative of harmful collinearity (Mason & Perreault, 1991). 
Furthermore, all variance inflation factors fell below an absolute value of 3.2 in the high crime 
models and 2.8 in the low crime models (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Results 
The analyses in Table 2 explore the perceived independent and additive effects of 
procedural justice, distributive justice, performance, trust, and obligation to obey on the 
perceived likelihood of citizens in high crime areas cooperating with the police. Model 1 
regresses the two-item cooperation scale onto the procedural justice scale along with each of the 
control variables. The model as a whole is statistically significant and accounts for roughly 37 
percent of the variation in perceived likelihood of cooperation in high crime areas (F = 11.37, p 
< .01). Procedural justice has a positive and significant relationship with perceived cooperation 
(b = .268, p < .01), suggesting the responding officers believe citizens in high crime areas are 
more likely to cooperate with the police when they evaluate police actions as procedurally fair.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 Model 2 regresses cooperation onto the distributive justice index along with each of the 
control variables. The model is statistically significant and explains 29 percent of the variation in 
perceived likelihood of citizen cooperation (F = 8.37, p < .01). The effect of distributive justice 
is moderately strong (b = .450, p < .01), which suggests the respondents believe cooperation 
from the public is more likely to occur when citizens believe the police enforce the law 
consistently and provide the same quality of service to all citizens. In Model 3, cooperation is 
regressed onto the performance index along with each of the control variables. This model is 
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statistically significant and accounts for slightly more variation in perceived cooperation (F = 
11.03, p < .01; R2 = .43) than Models 1 or 2. The performance estimate is significantly and 
positively related to cooperation (b = .264, p < .01), indicating that respondents believe police 
performance is important to citizens in terms of their willingness to cooperate with police.  
 Model 4 regresses cooperation onto the trust scale and each of the control variables. The 
model is statistically significant and accounts for about 31 percent of the variation in perceived 
cooperation (F = 9.33, p < .01). The trust estimate is moderately strong (b = .426, p < .01), which 
is evidence that respondents believe citizens who trust the police are more likely to cooperate. 
This finding parallels prior research using citizen samples which suggests that trust promotes 
cooperation with police (Sargeant et al., 2013). In Model 5, cooperation is regressed onto the 
obligation to obey index along with each of the controls. The model accounts for less variation 
than previous models (R2 = .19) but is still statistically significant (F = 4.36, p < .01). This 
suggests respondents believe citizens in high crime areas are more likely to cooperate with police 
when they feel obligated to obey the police. Jackson et al. (2012) report similar findings using 
METPAS data.  
 Model 6 regresses cooperation onto each of the independent variables along with all of 
the control variables. Performance dominates the model, as evidenced by the fact that it is the 
only independent variable that is statistically significant (b = .172, p < .01). The procedural 
justice, distributive justice, trust, and obligation to obey coefficients are each reduced in 
magnitude by roughly 68, 93, 78, and 99 percent, respectively. Each of these reductions is 
statistically significant at p < .01. Moreover, the model as a whole only accounts for slightly 
more of the variation in cooperation (R2 = .47) than Model 3. That is, accounting for procedural 
justice, distributive justice, trust, and obligation to obey in addition to performance only yields a 
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4 percent increase in the amount of explained variation in perceived cooperation (Model 3 R2 = 
.43). This finding is in stark contrast to Tyler’s research, which suggests that procedural 
justice—more so than performance—should increase cooperation through its effect on variables 
such as trust and obligation to obey (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; c.f. Tankebe, 2009).  
 Table 3 explores the perceived independent and additive effects of each of the 
aforementioned variables on the perceived likelihood of citizens in low crime areas cooperating 
with the police. Model 1 regresses the cooperation in low crime areas scale onto the procedural 
justice scale along with each control variable. The model as a whole is statistically significant (F 
= 4.92, p < .01) and accounts for roughly 35 percent of the variation in perceived likelihood of 
public cooperation. The procedural justice estimate (b = .340, p < .01) indicates that respondents 
from the sample believe citizens residing in low crime areas who perceive police actions as 
procedurally fair are more likely to cooperate with the police. Furthermore, the standardized 
partial regression coefficient for procedural justice in Model 1 of Table 3 (β = .570) is nearly 
identical to that of Model 1, Table 2 (β = .578). This suggests that respondents believe 
procedural justice is equally associated with citizen cooperation in high and low crime areas. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Similar findings emerge in Models 2 through 5. In Model 2, distributive justice (β = .530, 
p < .01) is positively associated with perceived likelihood of cooperation from the public. In 
Model 3, performance (β = .585, p < .01) is positively associated with cooperation, and in Model 
4, trust (β = .568, p < .01) emerges as the only statistically significant variable. In addition, each 
of the coefficients for the independent variables in these models is similar in magnitude to their 
respective coefficients from the models in Table 2—again indicating that respondents feel these 
concepts are equally associated with citizen cooperation in high and low crime areas. In Model 5, 
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obligation to obey (β = .306, p < .05) is positively correlated with cooperation, but the model as a 
whole is not statistically significant and explains somewhat less of the variation in perceived 
cooperation (about 14 percent) than Models 1 through 4 (between 31 and 36 percent). 
 Model 6 simultaneously regresses cooperation onto all of the independent and control 
variables. The model is statistically significant (F = 6.42, p < .01) and explains nearly half of the 
variation in perceived cooperation. Consistent with Table 2, performance (b = .127, p < .01) 
remains closely connected to perceived likelihood of cooperation in this fully specified model. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the procedural justice, distributive justice, and trust coefficients are 
reduced by 71, 81, and 57 percent, respectively (each reduction is statistically significant at p < 
.01). The obligation to obey coefficient is also reduced by 66 percent, but the reduction is not 
statistically significant. Note that the trust estimate retains statistical significance in Model 6, 
indicating that responding officers believe generating feelings of trust among citizens in low 
crime areas can also lead to cooperative behaviors. Indeed, the standardized partial regression 
coefficients for trust (β = .242) and performance (β = .249) are nearly identical. This suggests 
that respondents from the sample believe citizens are most likely to cooperate when they trust the 
police (Sargeant et al., 2013) and believe they are performing well (see Tankebe, 2009).  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The process-based model of regulation hypothesizes that when citizens perceive the 
police as legitimate, they are more likely to cooperate (Tyler & Huo, 2002). The best way for the 
police to enhance their legitimacy, according to Tyler (1990, 2004), is to exercise their authority 
in a procedurally fair manner when interacting with the public. Scholars have devoted a great 
deal of attention to the sources and consequences of legitimacy using citizen surveys. Until very 
recently, the perspectives of the other party involved in police-citizen interactions—the police—
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have not been examined. Accordingly, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p. 119) argue that scholars 
must consider the “dual and interactive character of legitimacy.” Doing so is crucial because the 
police may not be aware that procedural justice is the best way to enhance their legitimacy and 
ultimately increase the likelihood of public cooperation. Indeed, studies that have examined what 
the police believe underscores their legitimacy in the eyes of the public have yielded mixed 
evidence (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Nix, 2015). The present study moved this line of 
literature forward by asking law enforcement executives across the United States how they feel 
they are viewed by citizens from different areas within the community—namely, residents of 
high and low crime areas. A number of key findings emerged which warrant further discussion. 
The data reveal that officers in the present sample believe performance to be the primary 
means of attaining cooperation from citizens in high crime areas. This finding contradicts Tyler’s 
process-based model, which suggests that cooperation from the public is most likely to occur 
when the police are procedurally fair, thereby enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public. In other words, according to the process-based model, procedural justice promotes 
cooperation through its effect on legitimacy perceptions (i.e., trust in the police and obligation to 
obey). The present sample does not perceive this to be the case—at least in high crime areas. 
Analyses (not shown) revealed that procedural justice was significantly associated with trust and 
obligation to obey in high crime areas, yet trust was not significantly associated with cooperation 
in high crime areas. Instead, officers believe these citizens are most likely to cooperate with the 
police when they believe the police are effectively dealing with crime in the community 
(Tankebe, 2009). 
The fact that the present sample believes performance is the key to generating 
cooperation from citizens in high crime areas has important theoretical implications. One of the 
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main appeals of Tyler’s process-based model is that in addition to complying in both the 
immediate situation and long term, citizens are more likely to cooperate with the police when 
they are procedurally fair (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler & Huo, 2002). That is, they are more likely 
to report crimes and provide information to the police. The police rely heavily on public 
cooperation to fight crime and disorder in the community, but the present data reveal that they 
are unaware of the best pathway to achieving said cooperation: procedural fairness. Over time, 
should the police stress performance over procedural fairness, community members might 
become less inclined to cooperate. At the very least, individuals who experience procedural 
injustice on one occasion might be less motivated to report future victimizations and/or crimes 
they otherwise witness. This reduced willingness to cooperate could result in poorer performance 
over time due to fewer crimes being brought to the attention of the police. 
On the other hand, police appear to believe that in low crime areas, citizen cooperation is 
shaped by both performance and trust. This is more in line with findings from empirical studies 
that have examined citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler, 1990; 
Tyler & Huo, 2002). Yet this finding also indicates that the police believe the process-based 
model is more likely to be effective in low crime areas than in high crime areas. As such, they 
may be less willing to emphasize procedural fairness when interacting with citizens of high 
crime areas. These are arguably the areas that could benefit the most from process-based 
policing, as residents of these areas tend to harbor cynical attitudes toward the law and the police 
(Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Police could presumably restore 
confidence in their authority among these citizens by being procedurally fair while interacting 
with them. Yet the officers in this sample do not believe procedural justice can increase 
cooperation among citizens in high crime areas.  
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This study is not without limitations. For starters, the data is cross-sectional so it is not 
possible to speak about the causality of the observed relationships. In addition, the present study 
only surveyed one officer at each agency in the sample. Roughly 50 percent of the respondents 
were the Chief Executive of their respective agency (the remainder of respondents were hand 
selected by their Chief or Sheriff as an officer who could speak on behalf of the agency). As this 
is the first study of its kind in the U.S., it was important to gauge the perceptions of Chief 
Executives because the ideas they embrace are likely to trickle down throughout the agency and 
influence line-level officers. Nevertheless, it would be ideal to survey line level officers 
themselves moving forward, as they interact with citizens on a daily basis. Despite limitations 
such as these, the present study moves the procedural justice and legitimacy literatures forward 
by considering the dialogic nature of legitimacy, as Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) recommend. 
In conclusion, the present study indicates that the police associate public cooperation 
with their ability to effectively deal with crime in the community. This was especially true with 
regards to high crime areas, although in low crime areas of the community, respondents felt trust 
could also breed cooperation. Future research should continue to explore police officers’ 
understanding of their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, while also considering that their 
perceptions might vary according to contextual differences like level of crime. Their perceived 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public will affect police claims to legitimacy—yet if they do not 
accurately perceive their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the police might make legitimacy 
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County/Municipal Police 117 0.762% 8 1.244% 0.612 
County Sheriff 0 0 0 0 0 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 259 1.687% 8 1.244% 1.356 
County Sheriff 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
County/Municipal Police 281 1.830% 8 1.244% 1.471 
County Sheriff 3 0.020% 2 0.311% 0.064 
West 
County/Municipal Police 36 0.234% 7 1.089% 0.215 




County/Municipal Police 1,520 9.900% 9 1.400% 7.073 
County Sheriff 6 0.039% 2 0.311% 0.125 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 3,008 19.588% 15 2.333% 8.397 
County Sheriff 322 2.097% 5 0.778% 2.697 
South 
County/Municipal Police 2,799 18.227% 15 2.333% 7.813 
County Sheriff 219 1.427% 8 1.244% 1.147 
West 
County/Municipal Police 661 4.305% 10 1.555% 2.768 


































County/Municipal Police 923 6.011% 15 2.333% 2.577 
County Sheriff 52 0.339% 7 1.089% 0.311 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 837 5.451% 14 2.177% 2.504 
County Sheriff 497 3.237% 10 1.555% 2.081 
South 
County/Municipal Police 747 4.865% 14 2.177% 2.234 
County Sheriff 754 4.910% 10 1.555% 3.157 
West 
County/Municipal Police 361 2.351% 16 2.488% 0.945 




County/Municipal Police 93 0.606% 16 2.488% 0.244 
County Sheriff 44 0.287% 4 0.622% 0.461 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 120 0.781% 14 2.177% 0.359 
County Sheriff 98 0.638% 12 1.866% 0.342 
South 
County/Municipal Police 119 0.775% 21 3.266% 0.237 
County Sheriff 183 1.192% 13 2.022% 0.590 
West 
County/Municipal Police 127 0.827% 16 2.488% 0.332 




County/Municipal Police 37 0.241% 17 2.644% 0.091 
County Sheriff 100 0.651% 17 2.644% 0.246 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 49 0.319% 22 3.421% 0.093 
County Sheriff 136 0.886% 56 8.709% 0.102 
South 
County/Municipal Police 117 0.762% 58 9.020% 0.084 
County Sheriff 217 1.413% 76 11.820% 0.120 
West 
County/Municipal Police 97 0.632% 52 8.087% 0.078 





Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 M S.D. Min Max 
Cooperation H 5.811 1.392 2 8 
Cooperation L 6.675 1.302 2 8 
Trust H 8.662 1.657 3 12 
Trust L 9.875 1.461 3 12 
Obey H 8.923 2.438 4 16 
Obey L 10.459 2.152 4 16 
Procedural justice H 14.222 2.998 5 20 
Procedural justice L 16.274 2.184 9 20 
Distributive justice H 5.269 1.512 2 8 
Distributive justice L 6.295 1.059 2 8 
Performance H 17.425 3.229 6 24 
Performance L 19.255 2.555 9 24 
Chief executive .477 -- 0 1 
Male .942 -- 0 1 
Racial minority .123 -- 0 1 
Agency 10+ years .765 -- 0 1 
Position 10+ years .137 -- 0 1 
Police department .552 -- 0 1 
Northeast .148 -- 0 1 
Midwest .243 -- 0 1 
South .350 -- 0 1 
West .260 -- 0 1 

















Table 2. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on cooperation in high crime areas. 
 Cooperationa 





























-- -- .450** 
(.080) 
.489 -- -- -- -- -- -- .031 
(.072) 
.033 
Performance -- -- -- -- .264** 
(.032) 
.613 -- -- -- -- .172** 
(.053) 
.399 
Trust -- -- -- -- -- -- .426** 
(.076) 

































































































































































F-Test 11.37** 8.37** 11.03** 9.33** 4.36** 12.16** 
R2 .37 .29 .43 .31 .19 .47 






Table 3. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on cooperation in low crime areas. 
 Cooperationa 





























-- -- .652** 
(.134) 
.530 -- -- -- -- -- -- .126 
(.117) 
.103 
Performance -- -- -- -- .298** 
(.044) 
.585 -- -- -- -- .127** 
(.047) 
.249 
Trust -- -- -- -- -- -- .507** 
(.096) 

































































































































































F-Test 4.92** 3.61** 6.87** 4.71** 1.27 6.42** 
R2 .35 .31 .36 .33 .14 .47 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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